Sanctions in California Civil Discovery by Thompson, Robert S.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 8 | Number 2 Article 3
1-1-1968
Sanctions in California Civil Discovery
Robert S. Thompson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Robert S. Thompson, Sanctions in California Civil Discovery, 8 Santa Clara Lawyer 173 (1968).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss2/3
SANCTIONS IN CALIFORNIA
CIVIL DISCOVERY*
Robert S. Thompson**
In a sense sanctions are to pretrial discovery what taxes are to
government-regrettable but necessary. Absent superhuman stan-
dards of legal competence and ethics, compliance with the require-
ments of the discovery statutes must occasionally be coerced or it
will not occur. Hence the provisions in the law for sanctions.1 What
follows is a review of the California appellate decisions which have
considered the process of coercive discovery and of some trial court
experience as it bears upon the practicalities of the matter.
The array of sanctions available in California is impressive.
Potential penalties for misconduct in discovery range from dis-
missal or default in the action downward to reimbursement of the
expenses incurred by the adversary in a successful discovery motion.
While the California statutes are broad in asserting the power
of the trial judge to impose sanctions, they are sketchy in their de-
finition of limitations on that power. Neither the circumstances under
which sanctions may be imposed nor the guidelines for the choice of
severity of the sanction are detailed with precision by the code. Ap-
pellate court construction of the statutes has, however, supplied
much of this absent material, generally in a manner which has
tended to limit the ostensibly broad discretion granted to the trial
court.
DECISIONAL AND STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION
OF DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
Sanctions for failure of compliance with obligations imposed
by the civil discovery statutes are applicable both to parties to the
action and to strangers to it. Understandably, the penalty provisions
can operate both more broadly and more severely in the case of a
party than in the case of a witness.
* This article is based upon materials which will be included in a forthcoming
book on California Civil Discovery to be published by California Continuing Educa-
tion of the Bar and no further reproduction is authorized without express permission
of the Regents the University of California.
** B.S., 1940, LL.B., 1942 University of Southern California; Judge, Superior
Court, Los Angeles County, California (Discovery Department).
1 CAL. CoDE Cv. PROC. §§ 2016-36 (West Supp. 1965).
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One not a party nor one for whose benefit the action is prose-
cuted or defended may be subjected to the compulsion of discovery
only when he has been served with a subpoena in relation to his
deposition.2 That service imposes a duty to obey the subpeona and
to take the oath or affirmation at the commencement of the deposi-
tion, the breach of which may trigger the sanction of contempt.3
Failure to appear at the deposition also subjects the disobedient wit-
ness to a forfeiture of $100 and to liability for all damages to the
party aggrieved, both recoverable in a separate civil action.' Having
appeared and been sworn for his deposition, the non-party is im-
mune from penalty for misconduct until after he has been summoned
before a court which has ordered him -to act or to refrain from acting
in a particular fashion.' If he continues to be recalcitrant, he may be
punished by contempt for violation of the order of court.
The imposition of sanctions for refusal of discovery against a
non-party is rare. While theoretically nonappearance at deposition
creates a liability for contempt in the person who disobeys the
subpeona, it is common practice in California to permit the con-
tempt to be purged by a subsequent appearance for deposition. The
practicalities favor such an approach for it is, after all, the testimony
of the witness and not his punishment that is the object of the pro-
cess. If the party issuing the subpoena or his counsel remains ag-
grieved after the information to which he is entitled has been elicited,
he has his remedy in a separate civil action for forfeiture and
damages.7 That such actions are almost never filed is some indica-
tion that in the long run the purposes of all concerned are best served
by the approach now followed.
Failure of compliance with a court order governing response to
questioning or other conduct at deposition is also infrequent as to
non-parties. There is little reason for a person with no more than a
rooter's interest in the outcome of an action to disobey a court order.
Hence, as a practical matter, appearance on one occasion before the
court in response to an order to show cause resulting in an order
2 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1991.1 (West Supp. 1965).
3 Id.
4 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1992 (West 1957).
5 Lund v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. 2d 698, 394 P.2d 707, 39 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1964);
But see CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034(a) (West Supp. 1965). The sanction of reason-
able expenses of the party noticing the deposition for a refusal without substantial
justification to answer a question is, by the terms of the statute, applicable to a de-
ponent as well as to a party. This statutory language is ignored in Lund; however, the
broad scope of the Lund rule is confirmed in Weinkauf v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d
662, 414 P.2d 36, 51 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1966).
6 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034(b) (1) (West Supp. 1965); cf. Scott v. Shields,
8 Cal. App. 12, 16, 96 P. 385, 387 (1908).
7 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1992 (West 1957).
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directed to the non-party is generally inconvenience enough to
secure compliance.
Parties to an action or persons for whose benefit it is prosecuted
or defended are subject ,to the entire scope of sanctions provided by
the discovery act not only for their own derelictions but, in some
cases, for those of their officers, directors, superintendents, members,
agents, employees or managing agents.8
Refusal Without Substantial Justification
The mildest of penalties is that imposed against a party who
brings or resists a motion related to self-executing discovery "with-
out substantial justification." A party properly served with a notice
of deposition or a subpeona duces tecum re deposition becomes
bound without further court order to appear at the deposition, to
produce the material called for in the subpeona, and to answer all
proper questions. Similarly, a party properly served with inter-
rogatories or requests for admissions is obligated to respond to all
those which are proper There is a problem in determining that
which is proper since in many instances there is so much room. for
doubt that -the issue must be resolved by the court. The means for
resolution of this problem is a motion to compel answers, further
response or compliance with the subpeona ° Simple as it is, this
process is subject to abuse. A party may without good reason object
to a deposition question or to an interrogatory in order to obstruct
and delay his adversary. Conversely, a motion to compel answers
may be noticed for no purpose other than harassment where a proper
objection has been made. The Code of Civil Procedure at section
2034(a), in an apparent effort to control such abuses, provides for
a monetary penalty that may be assessed against a party so acting or
his counsel, if he advised the improper conduct.1
The key words in section 2034(a) are "refuses" and "without
substantial justification." If a party refuses to answer a question at
deposition, a motion may be made to compel the answer. The grant-
ing or denial of the motion cannot of itself result in a penalty to
either party. If, however, in granting the motion the court finds that
the refusal was without substantial justification, it may require the
refusing party or the attorney advising the refusal to pay the reason-
able expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in obtaining the
order. Conversely, if there is a refusal to answer but the motion to
8 CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 2034(b)(2) (West Supp. 1965).
9 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 2030, 2033 (West Supp. 1967).
10 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 2030, 2034(a), 2034(b) (West Supp. 1965).
11 See Andrews v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. App. 2d 756, 7 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1960).
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compel it is denied, the court may, if it finds that the motion was
made without substantial justification, require the moving party or
the attorney advising the motion to pay similar expenses. The same
rules apply where there is a refusal to answer interrogatories or to
respond to requests for admissions.
The definition of that conduct which constitutes a refusal has
not come easily. After some lower federal court decisions sought
to engraft an element of wilfulness into the word, 2 the United States
Supreme Court in Socigtg Internationale v. Rogers"3 found that a
refusal to give discovery means for the purposes of the Federal
Rules simply a failure of compliance irrespective of wilfulness and
regardless of the form taken.
The rule appears to be the same in California but with a com-
plication. A failure to give discovery in the form of an answer to a
question at deposition, to an interrogatory, or to a request for admis-
sions frequently arises from the assertion of an objection or a claim
of privilege. If there is no substance to the objection or claim, it may
be said that there was a refusal without substantial justification.
There is, however, a conflict between the holding of one California
Court of Appeal case and the language of another over -the appli-
cability of this proposition to the situation of an objection to inter-
rogatories.
In Frey v. Superior Court 4 the defendants were served with
interrogatories and responded with a claim of marital privilege.
Plaintiff then moved "for an order compelling petitioners to answer
the respective interrogatories." The trial court ordered answers to
the bulk of the questions and, having found a lack of substantial
justification for the claim of privilege, required the defendants to
pay plaintiff $50 as reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in obtaining
the order. The court of appeal sustained the award of sanctions
pursuant to section 2034 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Language in Fairfield v. Superior Court5 indicates a contrary
result. That decision considers a long history of discovery during
the course of litigation. Plaintiff commenced the process by serving
interrogatories upon two defendants who responded with a motion
for a protective order. The trial court denied the motion and ordered
answers within fifteen days. Defendants served their response in
the form of objections to each interrogatory. The objections were
12 Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Roth v. Paramount
Pictures Distrib. Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
13 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
14 237 Cal App. 2d 201, 46 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1965).
15 246 Cal. App. 2d 113, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1966).
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overruled. Only one defendant, then, answered the interrogatories.
On motion for further response the court found the answers given
inadequate, granted the motion as to both defendants, and imposed
sanctions of $100 against each defendant "for unnecessary legal
work required of plaintiff." Defendants sought review of the ruling
by petition for writ of mandate. The petition was denied without
opinion whereupon the plaintiff noticed a motion for further sanc-
tions for wilful failure to comply with a court order per section
2034(b) (2) (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hearing on this
motion was continued to permit the supreme court to act on the de-
fendants' petition for hearing of the denial of their application for
writ by the court of appeal. Hearing was denied and nine days later
additional sanctions of $200 were assessed by the trial court. The
court of appeal held the latter order imposing sanctions to be an
abuse of discretion by the trial court." Before reaching its decision,
however, the court discussed the generalities of sanctions for lack
of adequate response to interrogatories and in so doing stated:
In 1961 section 2030 was amended to provide in part that the "answers
shall respond to the written interrogatories; or, if any interrogatory
be deemed objectionable, the objection thereto may be stated by the
party addressed in lieu of response. If the party who has submitted the
interrogatories deems that further response is required, he may move
the court for an order requiring further response." . . . Since this sec-
tion does not provide for the imposition of sanctions against the object-
ing party, it cannot be said that the making of an objection is the
equivalent of a refusal to answer an interrogatory, however unsub-
stantial the objection may appear to the court. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 2034, subd. (a).) 1 7
The quoted language seems clear in its implication that a motion
to require further response to an interrogatory made after an objec-
tion is a remedy exclusive of action per section 2034(a), and in this
implication it is contrary to the decision in Frey. Frey, however,
seems more likely to represent the law of California than does the
quotation from Fairfield. The Fairfield quotation is introductory in
nature and unrelated to the decision.
Whatever doubt Fairfield casts on the vitality of the rule of
Soci~t6 Internationale"s in California, it does not appear in areas of
self-executing discovery other than interrogatories. The language
in Fairfield is by its own terms very limited in application. Addi-
16 As it stands for this proposition, the rationale of the decision in Fairfield rests
on the solid policy base that no litigant should be placed in the position of seeking
redress from an appellate court at the peril of being immediately exposed to sanctions
imposed by the judge whom he attempted to prove wrong.
17 246 Cal. App. 2d at 119, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
18 Soci~t6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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tionally, language of the California Supreme Court in Filipoff v.
Superior Court9 is strongly indicative of the definition to be given
the word "refusal."
In Filipoff counsel for plaintiff had moved unsuccessfully to
inspect certain documents. He then served upon one of ,the defen-
dants a subpeona duces tecum re deposition describing the same
documents. Counsel for the defendant 'brought the papers to the de-
position but refused to permit his client to refer to them in spite of
the defendant's testimony that he could not otherwise give full
answers to the questions. The articulated ground of objection was
the prior denial of 'the motion to inspect. In issuing a writ of mandate
directing the trial court to grant plaintiff's motion requiring defen-
dant to refer to and employ the notes in answering questions at
deposition, the court stated:
Even if petitioner's motion was made under subdivision (a) of section
2034, as assumed by the trial court, its reasons given for the denial were
erroneous. That denial was expressly based on the fact that petitioner
had pointed to no unanswered question that the court could order the
witness to answer. While it is true that all questions were "answered,"
the answers were subject to the limitation expressed by the witness
that he could not recall the full facts, that he could answer more fully
if his memory were refreshed by the notes called for in the subpeona
duces tecum, and that he refused to so refresh his memory by looking
at the notes which were present in the possession of his attorney. Cer-
tainly, the fact that the refusal came from the lips of his attorney rather
than from the witness is not basis for holding that the witness need
not comply.20
Filipoff, while not concerned with sanctions, most definitely
characterizes a lack of discovery based upon the assertion of legal
bar as a "refusal" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure
section 2034(a).
The second required definition in considering sanctions pursu-
ant to section 2034(a) is that of "without substantial justification."
Because they are so few, the reported cases are of little or no assis-
tance in supplying the definition. In the absence of a statutory defini-
tion and cases construing it, a statement of the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States provides the best indication of the intended meaning of that
phrase. In dealing with the Federal Rules, the committee says:
"[T]he rules should deter the abuse implicit in carrying or forcing
a discovery dispute to court when no genuine dispute exists."'"
19 56 Cal. 2d 443, 364 P.2d 315, 15 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1961).
20 Id. at 451, 364 P.2d at 319, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 143 (emphasis added).
21 Comml. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
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The imposition of the monetary sanction for action or inaction
without substantial justification is rarely applied in the Federal or
California courts. The committee's report notes the results of a
survey to the effect that in only one case out of fifty have Federal
District Courts awarded expenses in motions decided under Federal
Rule 37(a). 2 The report attributes the infrequency to a failure of
trial courts to adequately utilize a method of preventing abuses of
discovery. There is reason to disagree with that conclusion, however,
since it is not the only inference flowing from ,the statistical base. It
may well be that the rarity of imposition of the sanction is due to a
corresponding scarcity of situations brought before the court where
one side or the other is acting without substantial justification. An
advocate, after all, has a right to be wrong, even vigorously wrong,
on occasion without 'being liable :to penalty. While one side must
inevitably lose in every discovery motion, the loser has not per se
carried a dispute to court when no genuine dispute exists. The one-
in-fifty ratio may truly represent the proportion of cases in which
the loser has so acted.
Wilful Failure to Attend Deposition or Serve and File Answers to
Interrogatories
The full range of sanctions from dismissal or default to a mone-
tary penalty is applicable to the party who wilfully fails to appear
for his deposition or who wilfully fails to serve and file answers to
interrogatories.3 The potential of sanctions becomes applicable here
when (1) a party fails to serve and file answers to interrogatories
properly served upon him per Code of Civil Procedure section 2030,
or when a party or one of his officers, directors or managing agents
fails to appear at a properly noticed depQsition; and (2) the failure
is wilful.
There is little difficulty in determining whether there has been
a failure to appear at a disposition. Nonappearance at the noticed
time and place satisfies the requirement. Considerations of excuse
or extent of tardiness are applicable solely to the issue of wilful-
ness. The deposition situation does present a unique problem in
relation to vicarious liability for sanctions. The penalty can be im-
posed against a party by reason of the wilful failure of an officer,
director or managing agent to attend his duly noticed deposition.2
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES
OF CivrI PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS RELATING TO DEPOSI-
TION AND DISCOVERY, 92-93 (Nov. 1967).
22 Id. at 93.
23 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034(d) (West Supp. 1965).
24 Id.
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The vicarious liability becomes operative, however, only if the de-
faulting deponent occupies the designated relation to the party "at
the time the deposition is set."25 The quoted phrase probably, but
by no means certainly, should be construed as if it read "at the time
the deposition is to be taken." Such seems to be the current usage
of the words in the statute, a usage in contradistinction to "the
time when a deposition is noticed." Additionally, there is sound rea-
son for not imposing sanctions against a party for failure of his
agent where he in truth no longer has any control over him.
Wilful failure to appear at a deposition also subjects the party
to punishment for contempt.2 6 Once he has appeared he remains
liable for contempt if he refuses to be sworn but apparently not to
any other penalties, since section 2034(d) refers only to nonatten-
dance. If the party attends and is recalcitrant, there is an alterna-
tive in the form of a motion for an order of court compelling com-
pliance as provided in section 2034(a). Disobedience of that order
may then result in sanctions.
Determination of a failure "to serve and file answers to inter-
rogatories" raises a somewhat more obscure problem. Section 2034
(d) deals with answers to "interrogatories submitted under Section
2030 of this code." An answer, however, is not the only response
permitted by section 2030. "If any interrogatory be deemed ob-
jectionable, the objection thereto may be stated by the party ad-
dressed in lieu of response."2 7 It is a fair construction that an
objection to an interrogatory is not a failure to answer. Under the
rule of Frey v. Superior Court28 it can trigger a motion for further
response and a penalty against the objector if the objection was
made without substantial justification. But, it cannot trigger the
sanctions applicable to wilful failure to serve and file answers to
interrogatories.
The most common issue presented in cases of failure to attend
a deposition or to answer interrogatories is whether the failure was
wilful. Wilfulness is a word of more than one meaning in the law
but here connotes both a deliberate failure and one without good
reason. The intentional aspect of wilfulness has been defined by
Justice Bishop of the California Court of Appeal in the following
sentence:
Here the failure to attempt to make any explanation for the wife's long
silence, and the very long silence of the husband are not "mere fail-
25 Id.
26 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034(b) (1) (West Supp. 1965).
27 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2030 (West Supp. 1967).
28 Supra note 14.
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ures," but justify the trial court's conclusion that the failure was
"won'tfull" which under the circumstances, was "wilful." 29
Where there has been a failure of discovery, wilfulness may be
inferred and the burden is generally upon the failing party to ex-
plain."0 The proposition of inference and burden is not an absolute,
however. If, for example, a deponent arrives a few minutes late
for a deposition or a party is a few days delinquent in responding
to interrogatories, the inference is by no means inescapable. If, in
the case of interrogatories, service is accomplished by mail and there
is no further correspondence or discussion between counsel, an in-
ference of mistake in calendaring or a similar clerical error can be
drawn equally with that of wilfulness.
Refusal to Obey a Court Order
The complete range of sanctions may be imposed if a party or
one for whose immediate benefit the action is prosecuted or defended
refuses to obey a court order with respect to discovery." The order
may be made as a consequence of a motion to require an answer at
deposition or to interrogatories, or it may be one made under the
Code of Civil Procedure section 2019, dealing with protective or-
ders and appearances at certain depositions, section 2031, dealing
with production of documents, or section 2032, dealing with physi-
cal, mental and blood examinations.
Refusal in this context presumably has the same meaning as in
Soci~tg Internationale v. Rogers32 since section 2034(b) (2) which
provides for sanctions in this situation lacks the qualifying termi-
nology of "wilful" or "without substantial justification." A limita-
tion has, however, been engrafted onto the section by case law.
Thus, Fairfield v. Superior Court3 held that a trial court abused
its discretion in imposing sanctions for a refusal to comply with a
court order in a situation where the losing party had sought appel-
late court review of the order and had not been afforded a reason-
able time to comply when again unsuccessful.
The rule of vicarious liability is also present in the case of a
refusal to comply with an order of court. The class of persons whose
refusal may impose liability for sanctions is, however, different
from that described in the sections dealing with a wilful failure to
attend a deposition or to answer interrogatories. The sanctions im-
29 Frates v. Treder, 249 Cal. App. 2d 199, 206, 57 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1967).
30 Id.
31 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034(b)(2) (West Supp. 1965).
32 357 U.S. 197 (1958); See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
3 246 Cal. App. 2d 113, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1966).
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posed through vicarious liability for a refusal to obey a court order
pursuant to sections 2019, 2031 or 2032 extend only to derelictions
of an officer or managing agent but not to those of a director. If
the order is one pursuant to section 2034(a) compelling response to
a deposition or interrogatory, there is vicarious liability for the re-
fusals of superintendents, members, agents, employees, officers,
directors, and managing agents.34
The validity of a disobeyed order may be at issue in any at-
tempt to impose sanctions, and no penalty may be imposed if the
order was improperly although jurisdictionally made.33 There is no
obligation upon a party to attack a discovery order by extraordinary
writ as a condition precedent to raising invalidity as a defense to
the imposition of sanctions.36
Regardless of the type of error or omission that creates the
liability of a party for failure of discovery, one possible sanction is
the payment of expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to
the adversary. That form of penalty is distinctive in that it may be
imposed either on the disobedient party or his attorney. If the
sanction is one imposed by section 2034(a) for refusing discovery
or moving to compel it without substantial justification, there can
be liability upon the attorney only if he advised the improper
conduct.3 The same is true if the misconduct is a refusal to obey
a court order with respect to discovery.3 But a different situation
prevails if the dereliction is a failure to attend depositions or to
serve and file answers to interrogatories. Section 2034(d), which
controls the imposition of sanctions in that latter instance, refers
only to "that [defaulting] party or his attorney." The California
Supreme Court in Weinkauf v. Superior Court3 9 has interpreted that
section literally as permitting a court to penalize an attorney who
did not advise the nonattendance.
Requests for Admissions
A singular penalty is provided in the case of requests for ad-
missions served pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure section
2033. If a sworn denial of the truth of the fact or the genuineness
of the document is served, as permitted by that section, the court
may, upon application, order payment of reasonable expenses, in-
34 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034(b)(2) (West Supp. 1965).
35 Twin Lock, Inc. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 754, 344 P.2d 788 (1959);
Lindgren v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 743, 47 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1965).
36 Farnham v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 2d 451, 10 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1961).
37 CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 2034(b)(2) (West Supp. 1965).
38 Id.
39 64 Cal. 2d 662, 414 P.2d 36, 51 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1966).
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cluding attorneys' fees, incurred in making the successful proof
necessitated by the denial.40 In California this sanction is rarely
sought or imposed.
It is impossible to determine whether the sanction is rarely
imposed because seldom sought, or infrequently sought because of
the knowledge that imposition is so unlikely as to render the applica-
tion useless. Regardless of this uncertainty, it is clear that restric-
tions have been read into the statute which significantly narrow its
scope. The limitation is expressed in Chodos v. Superior Court:4 1
Costs go against the party denying the request only if the trial court
finds that "there were no good reasons for the denial"; and it was held
in Haseltine v. Haseltine [citations] that a serious and real contest as
to the subject matter of a requested admission constituted "good cause"
within the meaning of the statute.42
The language of Chodos may overly restrict the applicability
of sanctions for a denial of a requested admission without good rea-
son. It is noteworthy that the case involved the obligation to respond
to a request by admission or denial and not the imposition of sanc-
tions. The language is thus dictum only. Further, there is doubt that
Haseltine v. Haseltine43 stands for the proposition cited. In that
case the appellate court, in upholding the discretion of the trial
court in refusing the sanction, found not only that the issues to
which the requests were directed raised a serious and real contest
but also that they were difficult to resolve. If a court finds difficulty
in resolving an issue, certainly a party must be held to have had good
reason for presenting the issue for resolution and should, therefore,
be immune from the sanctions.
The sanction for a denial of a request for admission without
good reason is probably neither sought nor granted with the fre-
quency that is desirable. If the device were more commonly and
intelligently used, it could contribute materially to shortening the
course of litigation. By way of example, two situations typically
involved in personal injury actions can be considered.
Commonly, answers in auto accident cases set up the affirma-
tive defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.
Granting that the issues are important to the lawsuit, good reason
for denial of a request to admit that the facts are contrary would
seem to be lacking once the defendant has had an ample opportunity
to complete his investigation and has turned up nothing in support.
40 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2034(c) (West Supp. 1965).
41 215 Cal. App. 2d 318, 30 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1963).
42 Id. at 324, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
43 203 Cal. App. 2d 48, 21 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1962).
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An almost equally common occurrence in this type of litigation is
the plaintiff's contention that he was incapacitated for a stated
period. The course of litigation could be shortened and settlement
induced if the plaintiff making such a claim ran the risk of having
to pay a substantial portion of the cost of proving a shorter time
of incapacitation than was alleged. Other situations where a liberal
rather than a strict construction of the sanction statute in this area
would expedite the course of litigation involve those pleadings which
are raised as a matter of course and not always of fact.
Limitations Upon and Review of Sanctions Imposed
The extent of the penalty for a violation of a duty with respect
to civil discovery is precisely delineated by the statute only in the
case of "lack of substantial justification" motions or refusals under
section 2034(a). There the sanction is an amount equal to reason-
able expenses of the prevailing party, including attorneys' fees. A
greater monetary penalty cannot be assessed.4 4 If the sanction is
for failure to obey a court order relating to discovery or for a
wilful failure to attend a deposition or to answer an interrogatory,
the statute appears to vest an unqualified choice from among the
whole range of penalties in the trial judge. The range is expressed
in detail in section 2034(b) (2)." 5 Essentially the same thing is said,
44 Lund v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. 2d 698, 394 P.2d 707, 39 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1964).
45"If any party or person for whose immediate benefit the action or proceeding is
prosecuted or defended, or an officer, director, superintendent, member, agent, em-
ployee or managing agent of any such party or person refuses to obey an order made
under subdivision (a) of this section, or if any party or an officer or managing agent
of a party refuses to obey an order made under Sections 2019, 2031 or 2032 of this
code, the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among
others the following: (i) An order that the matters regarding which the questions
were asked, or the character or description of the thing or land, or the contents of the
paper, or the physical or mental or blood condition of the person sought to be ex-
amined, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes
of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (ii) An
order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims
or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated documents or
things or items of testimony, or from introducing evidence of the physical or mental
or blood condition of the person sought to be examined; (iii) An order striking out
pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or
dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by
default against the disobedient party; (iv) An order requiring the disobedient party
or the attorney advising such disobedience to pay to the party obtaining an order
under this section the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including
reasonable attorney's fees; (v) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, an order directing the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying
any of such orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental or blood examina-
tion; (vi) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under subdivision (a) of
Section 2032 of this code requiring him to produce another for examination, such
orders as are listed in (i), (ii), and (iii) of this subdivision of this section, unless the
party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such person for exami-
nation."
DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
though in fewer words, in section 2034(d).46 The sanction may be
anything from an order striking a pleading and entering a default
or dismissal to a small monetary penalty with wide options in be-
tween.
The discretion of the trial judge in determining the precise
sanction is by no means as broad as a superficial reading of the
statute might indicate. The principal limitation upon the trial
judge's discretion is that the sanction may not operate in such a
fashion as to put the prevailing party in a better position in the
lawsuit than he would have had if he had obtained the discovery
sought and it had been completely favorable to his cause. An order
striking a defendant's answer and entering a default for failure to
answer interrogatories was held to be an abuse of discretion where
the interrogatories went to one issue only, the dangerous nature of
defendant's product, and not to all matters in dispute in the law-
suit.47 The court noted that the appropriate sanction was an order
that as to that issue the facts should be deemed established as
contended by the plaintiff. Where the situation is reversed, in that
discovery by one will tend to support the cause of the other, an
order can be made barring the evidence that would have been re-
vealed by proper discovery."8 This basic principle precludes the
imposition of an increased sanction to enforce payment of a mone-
tary penalty imposed for a failure or refusal of discovery and an
order dismissing plaintiff's case, or striking a defendant's answer,
conditioned upon the payment of a monetary sanction. 9
There is authority that sanctions other than reimbursement of
expenses are inappropriate where discovery has been delayed but
not denied. This proposition has been applied to find an abuse of
discretion in a trial judge's order entering a default where the de-
fendant was tardy in responding to interrogatories but eventually
46 "If a party or a person for whose immediate benefit the action or proceeding
is prosecuted or defended or anyone who at the time the deposition is set is an officer,
director, or managing agent of any such party or person willfully fails to appear before
the officer who is to take his deposition, after said party or his attorney has been
served with a proper notice in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (a) (4)
of Section 2019 of this code, or if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party
willfully fails to serve and file answers to interrogatories submitted under Section 2030
of this code, after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and
notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that
party, or impose such other penalties of a lesser nature as the court may deem just,
and may order that party or his attorney to pay to the moving party the reasonable
expenses in making such motion, including reasonable attorney's fees."
47 Caryl Richards, Inc. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 2d 300, 10 Cal. Rptr.
377 (1961).
48 Mellone v. Lewis, 233 Cal. App. 2d 4, 43 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1965).
49 Welgoss v. End, 252 A.C.A. 1048, 61 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1967).
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did so prior to entry of the order.50 A similar result attached where
the defendant refused to appear for a deposition on the noticed day
but, at that time, informed plaintiff that he was available at a later
date.5
The restrictions upon the trial court's discretion are often
expressed by saying that "the purpose of sanctions is to obtain com-
pliance and not punishment."52 This phrase, like most slogans, is a
danger to the intelligent application of legal doctrine. A monetary
sanction of $50, while only partially reimbursing the prevailing
party, is definitely punitive in its operation against the one who
must pay. Dismissal of an action for total failure of discovery
certainly punishes the plaintiff, but there are times when that sanc-
tion must be imposed in justice to the prevailing party and despite
protestations that the requisite discovery is forthcoming at some
later time. Thus, Unger v. Los Angeles Transit Lines5 3 upheld an
order of the trial court striking defendant's answer for failure to
comply with a prior court order in spite of the defendant's assur-
ances that he would seek appellate review of the order striking his
answer and would promptly respond if unsuccessful. The true doc-
trine seems to be that so long as the penalty is appropriate to the
dereliction, does not exceed that which is required to protect the
interest of the party entitled to but denied discovery, and is one
described by the statute, its imposition is within the discretion of
the trial judge.
The bulk of cases imposing limitations upon the power of the
trial judge's discretion deal with penalties claimed to be overly
severe. Two cases considered the opposite side of the scales. In
Rosen v. Superior Court 4 the court of appeal held that the trial
judge had abused his discretion by denying the sanction of reim-
bursement of expense, per section 2019(g), for failure of counsel
noticing a deposition to appear at it. Six months later the supreme
court in Pember v. Superior Court,55 dealing with sanctions for
refusal to answer questions at deposition, stated:
Furthermore, section 2034, subdivision (a), of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that if a motion to compel answers is granted, and the
50 Fred Howland Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. App. 2d 605, 53 Cal. Rptr.
341 (1966).
51 Crummer v. Beeler, 185 Cal. App. 2d 851, 8 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1960).
52 See, e.g., Welgoss v. End, 252 A.C.A. 1048, 1058, 61 Cal. Rptr. 52, 59 (1967).
53 180 Cal. App. 2d 172, 4 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1960), rehearing denied, 5 Cal. Rptr.
71 (1960). The Unger decision analyzes the impact of the United States Supreme Court
holdings in Socit6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). See also Hammond
Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909) ; Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897);
Peterson v. City of Vallejo, 259 A.C.A. 803 (1968).
54 244 Cal. App. 2d 586, 53 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1966).
55 66 Cal. 2d 601, 427 P.2d 167, 58 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1967).
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trial court finds that the refusal was without substantial justification,
it may require the refusing party to pay the costs of the examining
party. Thus, even if a trial court finds that the refusal was without sub-
stantial justification, it is not required to award costs. 50
Rosen is not cited or discussed in Pember but both decisions
deal with the same key phrase, "the court may," which appears in
all code sections relating to sanctions. If the language in Pember is
taken as a statement of the law, sanctions are at all times permissive
with the trial court and never mandatory. Thus, in effect, the deci-
sion of the court of appeal in Rosen, that sanctions are sometimes
mandatory, has been overruled.
The entering of a dismissal as a sanction pursuant to section
2034(b) raises the question of the nature of the dismissal. There
seems to be no California appellate case determining whether such
a dismissal is with or without prejudice so the law must be con-
sidered as unsettled. Cases construing Federal Rule 37(c), em-
powering federal courts to dismiss a proceeding as a penalty for
failure of discovery, hold that the dismissal may be either, i.e.,
whichever is appropriate to the dereliction. Since Rule 37(c) is
similar in essentials to the California discovery sanction statutes,
the federal cases are, to a degree, pursuasive. But, the general rule
in California is that a dismissal not on the merits is without preju-
dice.5" It is arguable that a "sanction" dismissal, being a form of
disposition not on the merits, is within that general rule. In the
common case where the order of dismissal is silent as to its being
with or without prejudice, it probably will be construed as being
the latter.
A related problem exists concerning the power of a court to
impose sanctions against a plaintiff after he has voluntarily dis-
missed the action. This, too, is unresolved by the California cases. 59
By analogy to the proposition that a voluntary dismissal precludes
a court from rendering a judgment for the defendant,"° such a dis-
missal probably deprives the court of jurisdiction to impose sanc-
tions too.
An order imposing sanctions is subject to reconsideration by
the court which granted it upon a motion specifically for that pur-
pose or upon a motion to be relieved of default pursuant to Code
56 Id. at 604, 427 P.2d at 169, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
57 Mooney v. Central Motor Lines, 222 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1955); Producers
Releasing Corp. de Cuba v. PRC Pictures, 176 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1949).
58 Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar., 14 Cal. 2d 47, 92 P.2d 804 (1939).
59 See Lund v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. 2d 698, 394 P.2d 707, 39 Cal. Rptr. 891
(1964).
60 Provencher v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. App. 2d 730, 52 P.2d 983 (1935).
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of Civil Procedure section 473. The order is also subject to review
by an appellate court.
During the six-month period provided for relief from default
by section 473, the party against whom a discovery sanction is
imposed can move, in effect, for a modification of the order. The
court in such event may set aside its prior order and impose a lesser
sanction, 6' or, presumably, if the proper case is made, impose no
sanction at all. Where the attack is limited to jurisdictional grounds,
as it commonly is after the six-month period, the issue of modifica-
tion of a prior sanction order must be determined from the judg-
ment roll."2 Since notices of motions and the motions themselves are
not part of the judgment roll, an effort to set aside the ruling will
be extremely difficult if not impossible after the six months has run.
The propriety of an order imposing a discovery penalty is re-
viewable by the higher courts. A penalty of dismissal or default
results in an appealable order. In other cases of sanctions an appeal
normally will not lie 63 but the matter can be reviewed on a petition
for extraordinary writ.6 4
IMPACT OF THE CALIBER OF THE TRIAL BAR AND OF JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT ON DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
Any discussion of the California discovery sanctions is incom-
plete if limited to source material at the appellate level. Civil dis-
covery works well in practice not only because of the nature of the
statutes and case law but also by reason of the intelligent approach
to discovery by the trial bar and the reasonable application of dis-
cretion by the trial judges. Indeed, it may be said that these two
latter factors are of at least equal importance with statutory and
case law. A discussion of the roles of the bar and trial bench must,
of necessity, be substantially lacking in citation to authority. The
following is based, however, upon experience with something in ex-
cess of 3,000 discovery motions heard in the span of one year.
65
It is only the tip of the discovery iceberg that is discernible
61 Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., 243 Cal. App. 2d 1, 52 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1966).
62 Johnson v. Hayes Cal. Builders, Inc., 60 Cal. 2d 572, 387 P.2d 394, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 618 (1963).
63 Munson v. Singer, 238 Cal. App. 2d 697, 48 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1965).
64 Lund v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. 2d 698, 394 P.2d 707, 39 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1964).
65 The Superior Court of Los Angeles County has 134 judges. The bulk of dis-
covery motions filed in that court are heard by one department, thus forcing an ele-
ment of specialization upon the judge sitting in that department. Much of the law of
California civil discovery is due to the creativity of Judge Philbrick McCoy who
presided over the discovery department for over eight years. The author speaks some-
what humbly from the experience of one year's assignment to the discovery department.
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within court records. Such questions as are determined by the
courts represent a very small fraction of the total civil discovery
issues that are presented to the bench and bar. Of those discovery
matters which do find their way into court, a minority involve
requests for the imposition of sanctions.
The infrequency of sanction cases relative to the total volume
of civil discovery is unquestionably largely the result of a recogni-
tion by lawyers engaged in trial practice of the conceptual funda-
mentals of discovery. There is general acceptance of the philosophy
of voluntary cooperation and understanding of the basics of the
applicable statutes. This proposition tends to be proved by the ex-
ceptional cases, those involving sanctions which do get before the
court.
A relatively small number of lawyers are involved in a sig-
nificantly high percentage of sanction cases, irrespective of their
general litigation load. If a lawyer is within that group which is a
regular participant in matters involving sanctions, it is a virtual
certainty that he will be bringing motions to impose sanctions and
defending against such motions in about equal proportions. If a
lawyer is within the group whose courtroom experience with sanc-
tions is small in relation to his trial participation, the chances are
overwhelming that in his rare sanction cases he will be seeking
both to impose and resist sanctions at various times. It is safe to
conclude from these relationships that sanctions serve a need
primarily in those fortunately uncommon situations where, due to
the individuals involved or the nature of the litigation, human fac-
tors overcome objectivity.
The approach of the trial bench to the imposition of sanctions
is also of great practical importance. There seems to be a general
attitude on the part of the trial bench to err on the side of denial
of sanctions in borderline cases. This inclination is a reasoned one.
Discovery is but a process and not the ultimate objective of the
lawsuit. It is the obligation of the trial court to direct discovery so
as to contribute to and not detract from that ultimate objective.
Sanctions unwisely imposed can have an adverse effect in this con-
text, since lawyers tend to be contentious and once stung seldom
ignore the opportunity to create a situation in which they can
deliver a counterpunch. If the trial judge should impose a dis-
covery sanction too readily, he may well create an atmosphere of
retaliation which detracts from the proper conduct of the lawsuit.
Restraint in the imposition of sanctions is further promoted
by the knowledge that there is rarely a substantial risk that a denial
of a sanction will cause much harm. If it does, it is most likely to
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be in the form of a subsequent failure or refusal, at which time there
will be adequate opportunity to apply corrective measures. It may
well be that the supreme court had in mind the desirability of this
restraint when, in Pember v. Superior Court,66 it declared that the
trial judge has an unqualified discretion to refuse to impose dis-
covery sanctions.
The one exception to the desirability of restraint is in the area
of sanctions for a denial without good reason of a request for ad-
mission. Here real damage can be done both to the party who is
forced to bear the expense of unnecessary proof and to the taxpayers
who must subsidize the cost of court time spent in the litigation of
unnecessary issues. If California experience has taught anything, it
is that to the extent there is a needed area of reform is includes the
encouragement of this form of sanction.
CONCLUSION
The common thread binding most of the discovery sanction
problem areas together is the presence of judicial editorializing upon
the terms of the statutes. This is apparent in the conflict between
the decisions in Frey and Fairfield and in the difficulties raised by
the slogan that sanctions are intended to insure compliance rather
than punishment. Likewise, it appears in the reading of "may" as
"must" in Rosen and in the hardship caused by the overly broad
construction in Chodos that a "serious and real contest" is a "good
reason" for a denial of a requested admission, though in fact there
may be no basis at all for the contest.
A strict construction which assumes that the draftsmen in-
tended to say what they did tends to avoid these problems and the
creation of unnecessary grey areas. In dealing with code sections of
an essentially procedural nature, such an approach with its conse-
quences of the greatest possible certainty is very desirable. Certainty
will encourage the trial bar to engage in voluntary discovery and
discourage contests. Further, it will create rules by which the trial
judges' discretion may be so exercised as to allow discovery to play
its full and proper role in the litigation process.
66 66 Cal. 2d 601, 427 P.2d 167, 58 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1967).
